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在資訊交流的不對等下，
雙方認定的非同件事物。

這年頭，我看大家都怕死；
可是被騙的照樣一堆。


在看完移動世界，
我能明白那種感覺。

我覺得要結束一段情，
是有沒有那麼不共戴天阿！
所以我向來沒主動結束過。

而我又奇怪的感覺是，
不滿竟源源不絕從何而來。

08年8月4號

Fisher's Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions and a Possible Revision 費舍爾的債務通貨緊縮理論的大窪地和可能修訂
by London Banker由倫敦銀行家

"Panics do not destroy capital; they merely reveal the extent to which it has been previously destroyed by its betrayal into hopelessly unproductive works." “恐慌不破壞資本;他們只是透露在何種程度上已經破壞了以前的背叛到無可救藥非生產性工程。 ”
- John Stuart Mill -彌爾

I have been both a central banker and a market regulator.我一直都中央銀行家和市場調節。 I now find myself questioning whether my early career, largely devoted to liberalising and deregulating banking and financial markets, was misguided.我現在發現自己質疑我的職業生涯早期，主要用於自由化和放鬆管制的銀行和金融市場，是錯誤的。 In short, I wonder whether I contributed - along with a countless others in regulation, banking, academia and politics - to a great misallocation of capital, distortion of markets and the impairment of the real economy.總之，我不知道我是否貢獻-連同無數其他的監管，銀行，學術界和政治-一個偉大的資本配置不當，扭曲的市場和損害實質經濟。 We permitted the banks to betray capital into "hopelessly unproductive works", promoting their efforts with monetary laxity, regulatory forbearance and government tax incentives that marginalised investment in "productive works".我們允許銀行的資本背叛到“絕望非生產性工程” ，促進他們的努力與貨幣不嚴，監管忍和政府稅收獎勵，被邊緣化的投資“生產性工程” 。 We permitted markets to become so fragmented by off-exchange trading and derivatives that they no longer perform the economically critical functions of capital/resource allocation and price discovery efficiently or transparently.我們允許市場變得如此支離破碎的場外外匯交易和衍生工具，他們不再履行經濟職能的重要資本/資源配置和價格發現效率或透明。 The results have been serial bubbles - debt-financed speculative frenzy in real estate, investments and commodities.結果是串行泡沫-債務融資的投機熱潮，房地產，投資和商品。

Since August of 2007 we have been seeing a steady constriction of credit markets, starting with subprime mortgage back securities, spreading to commercial paper and then to interbank credit and then to bond markets and then to securities generally.自2007年8月，我們已經看到了穩定收縮的信貸市場，從抵押貸款支持證券，蔓延到商業票據，然後到銀行間的信貸和債券市場，然後以證券一般。 While the problem is usually expressed as one of confidence, a more honest conclusion is that credit extended in the past has been employed unproductively and so will not be repaid according to the original terms.雖然這個問題通常是作為一個信心，更誠實的結論是，信貸在過去一直採用和非生產性將不會歸還按照原條款。 In other words, capital has been betrayed into unproductive works.換言之，資本已經背叛到非生產性工程。

The credit crunch today is not destroying capital but recognising that capital was destroyed by misallocation in the years of irrational exuberance.信貸緊縮的今天是不是破壞了資本，而且認識到，資本分配不當摧毀了在未來幾年的非理性繁榮。 If that is so, then we are entering a spiral of debt deflation that will play out slowly for years to come.如果是這樣的話，那麼，我們正進入一個惡性循環的債務通縮，將發揮出緩慢幾年。 To understand how that works, we turn to Professor Irving Fisher of Yale .了解如何工作的，我們把教授歐文費雪的耶魯大學。

Like me, Professor Fisher lived to question his earlier convictions and pursuits, learning by dear experience the lessons of financial instability.像我一樣，費希爾教授生活問題他以前的信念和追求，學習，親愛的經驗教訓，金融不穩定的影響。

Professor Fisher was an early mathematical economist, specialising in monetary and financial economics.費希爾教授是早期數學的經濟學家，專門從事貨幣和金融經濟學。 Fisher's contributions to the field of economics included the equation of exchange, the distinction between real and nominal interest rates, and an early analysis of intertemporal allocation.費舍爾貢獻的領域包括經濟學方程的交流，區分實際利率和名義利率，並及早分析際分配。 As his status grew, he became an icon for popularising 1920s fads for investment, healthy living and social engineering, including Prohibition and eugenics.由於他的地位上升，他成為一個圖標為推廣20世紀20年代流行的投資，健康的生活和社會工程，包括禁止和優生學。

He is less famous for all of this today than for his one statement in September 1929 that "stock prices had reached a permanently high plateau".他是那麼出名的所有這一切的今天比他的一項聲明中1929年9月說， “股票價格已達到了永久高原” 。 He subsequently lost a personal fortune of between $6 and $10 million in the crash.隨後，他失去了個人財富之間的6美元和1000萬美元的崩潰。 As JK Galbraith remarked, "This was a sizable sum, even for an economics professor."正如JK加爾布雷思所說， “這是一個相當大的一筆，即使是經濟學教授。 ” Fisher's investment bank failed in the bear market, losing the fortunes of investors and his public reputation.費舍爾的投資銀行未能在熊市，失去了投資者的財富和他的公眾聲譽。

Professor Fisher made his "permanently high plateau" remark in an environment very similar to that prevailing in the summer of 2007.費希爾教授提出他的“高原永久”是在一個環境非常相似，當前在2007年夏季。 Currencies had been competitively devalued in all the major nations as each sought to gain or defend export market share.貨幣已貶值競爭力在所有主要國家，因為每個尋求收益或捍衛出口的市場份額。 The devaluation stoked asset bubbles as easy credit led to more and more speculative investments, including a boom in globalisation as investors bought bonds from abroad to gain higher yields.貶值，引發資產泡沫，因為寬鬆的信貸導致越來越多的投機性投資，其中包括全球經濟一體化的繁榮，投資者買進國債從國外獲得更高的產量。 Then, as now, many speculators on Wall Street had unshakeable faith in the Federal Reserve's ability to keep the party going.當時和現在一樣，許多投機者在華爾街已不可動搖的信念在美國聯邦儲備的能力，永葆黨去。

After the crash and financial ruin, Professor Fisher turned his considerable talents to determining the underlying mechanisms of the crash.後墜毀和財政破產，關閉費舍爾教授做了大量的人才，確定的基本機制的崩潰。 His Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions (1933) was powerful and resonant, although largely neglected by officialdom, Wall Street and academia alike.他的債務通貨緊縮理論的偉大凹陷（ 1933年）是強大的共振，雖然在很大程度上忽略了官場，華爾街和學術界都。 Fisher's theory raised too many uncomfortable questions about the roles played by the Federal Reserve, Wall Street and Washington in propagating the conditions for credit excess and the debt deflation that followed.費舍爾的理論提出了太多的不舒服的問題所發揮的作用美聯儲，華爾街和華盛頓在傳播的條件和信貸過多的債務通貨緊縮之後。

The whole paper is worth reading carefully, but I'll extract here some choice quotes which give a flavour of the whole.整個文件是值得一讀的仔細，但我會在這裡摘錄一些選擇尋獲這讓風味的整體。 Prefacing his theory, Fisher first discusses instability around equilibrium and the influence of 'forced' cycles (like seasons) and 'free' cycles (self-generating like waves).前言他的理論，費希爾首先討論各地不穩定的平衡和影響的'被迫'週期（如季節）和'免費'週期（自我生成像海浪） 。 Unlike the Chicago School, Fisher says bluntly that "exact equilibrium thus sought is seldom reached and never long maintained. New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below ideal equilibrium."不同的是芝加哥學派，費希爾說，直言不諱地說， “因此，確切尋求平衡，很少和從未達到長期保持下去。新的干擾，人為地講，一定要出現，因此，事實上，任何變數是幾乎總是高於或低於理想的平衡“ 。 He bluntly asserts:他直言不諱地聲稱：

"Theoretically there may be -- in fact, at most times there must be -- over- or under-production, over- or under-consumption, over- or under-spending, over- or under-saving, over- or under-investment, and over or under everything else. It is as absurd to assume that, for any long period of time, the variables in the economic organization, or any part of them, will "stay put," in perfect equilibrium, as to assume that the Atlantic Ocean can ever be without a wave." “理論上有可能-事實上，在多數情況下，必須有-超過或低於生產，超過或低於消費量，超過或低於支出，超過或低於儲蓄，超過或低於投資，並超過或低於一切。這是荒謬的假定，任何長的一段時間，變數的經濟組織，或任何部分的他們，將“原地不動” ，在完美的平衡，以假設大西洋都不能成為不波。 “

While disturbances will cause oscillations which lead to recessions, he suggests:雖然騷亂將導致振盪從而導致經濟衰退，他建議：

"[I]n the great booms and depressions, each of the above-named factors has played a subordinate role as compared with two dominant factors, namely over-indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after; also that where any of the other factors do become conspicuous, they are often merely effects or symptions of these two." “ [我] n的大繁榮和窪地，每個上述因素發揮了次要的角色相比，有兩個主要因素，即債務負擔過重，開始與下面的通貨緊縮後不久，又在其他任何這樣的因素突出，他們往往只是影響或symptions這兩個。 “

This is the critical argument of the paper.這是關鍵的參數文件。 Viewed from this perspective we may see USA and UK decades of under-production, over-consumption, over-spending and under-investment as all tending to a greater imbalance in debt which may, if combined with oscillations induced by disturbances, take the US and UK economies beyond the point where they could right themselves into a deflationary spiral.從這個角度看，我們可以看到美國和英國下幾十年的生產，過度消費，過度消費和投資不足的一切趨於更加不平衡的債務可能，如果再加上振盪的干擾所致，在美國和英國經濟超越的地步，他們有權自己可以成為一個通貨緊縮惡性循環。

Fisher outlines how just 9 factors interacting with one another under conditions of debt and deflation create the mechanics of boom to bust for a Great Depression:費舍爾概述了如何只有9因素相互作用與其他條件下的債務和通貨緊縮的創造力學繁榮蕭條的大蕭條：

Assuming, accordingly, that, at some point of time, a state of over-indebtedness exists, this will tend to lead to liquidation, through the alarm either of debtors or creditors or both.假設，因此，在有些時候，一個國家的債務負擔過重存在，這將往往導致清算，通過報警或者債務人或債權人或兩者兼施。 Then we may deduce the following chain of consequences in nine links: (1) Debt liquidation leads to distress selling and to (2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank loans are paid off, and to a slowing down of velocity of circulation.然後，我們可以推導出以下鏈的後果在九個環節： （ 1 ）債務清算導致遇險銷售和（ 2 ）收縮貨幣的存款，作為銀行貸款的回報，並放慢速度的流通。 This contraction of deposits and of their velocity, precipitated by distress selling, causes (3) A fall in the level of prices, in other words, a swelling of the dollar.這收縮的存款和他們的速度，沉澱遇險銷售，原因（ 3 ）下降的價格水平，換句話說，腫脹美元。 Assuming, as above stated, that this fall of prices is not interfered with by reflation or otherwise, there must be (4) A still greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies and (5) A like fall in profits, which in a "capitalistic," that is, a private-profit society, leads the concerns which are running at a loss to make (6) A reduction in output, in trade and in employment of labor.假設，如上所說，這屬於價格不干預的通貨或其他方式，就必須有（ 4 ）更大的下降，淨值得的商業，沉澱破產和（ 5 ）喜歡的利潤下降，這在“資本主義” ，即一個私人的非營利的社會，領導的關注，正在運行處於虧損狀態，使（ 6 ）減少產量，貿易和就業的勞動力。 These losses, bankruptcies and unemployment, lead to (7) Hoarding and slowing down still more the velocity of circulation.這些損失，破產和失業，導致（ 7 ）囤積和減緩更是速度的流通。

The above eight changes cause (9) Complicated disturbances in the rates of interest, in particular, a fall in the nominal, or money, rates and a rise in the real, or commodity, rates of interest.上述8個變化原因（ 9 ）複雜的動亂中的利率，特別是秋天的名義，或金錢，利率和上升的實際，或商品，利率。

Evidently debt and deflation go far toward explaining a great mass of phenomena in a very simple logical way.顯然，債務和通貨緊縮大大有助於解釋一個偉大質量的現象，一個很簡單的邏輯之中。

Hyman Minsky and James Tobin credited Fisher's Debt-Deflation Theory as a crucial precursor of their theories of macroeconomic financial instability.海曼和明斯基詹姆斯托賓記費舍爾的債務通貨緊縮理論的一個關鍵前體的宏觀經濟理論，金融不穩定。

Fisher explicitly ties loose money to over-indebtedness, fuelling speculation and asset bubbles:費舍爾明確關係鬆散的金錢債務負擔過重，助長投機和資產泡沫：

Easy money is the great cause of over-borrowing.錢是很容易的偉大事業中過度借貸。 When an investor thinks he can make over 100 per cent per annum by borrowing at 6 per cent, he will be tempted to borrow, and to invest or speculate with the borrowed money. This was a prime cause leading to the over-indebtedness of 1929.當投資者認為他可以超過100個，每半年由借貸百分之六，他將受到誘惑而借款，並投資或投機與借錢。這是一個主要原因導致過度負債的1929年。 Inventions and technological improvements created wonderful investment opportunities, and so caused big debts.發明和技術改進創造美好的投資機會，因此造成大的債務。

* * * * * *

The public psychology of going into debt for gain passes through several more or less distinct phases: (a) the lure of big prospective dividends or gains in income in the remote future; (b) the hope of selling at a profit, and realising a capital gain in the immediate future; (c) the vogue of reckless promotions, taking advantage of the habituation of the public to great expectations; (d) the development of downright fraud, imposing on a public which had grown credulous and gullible.公眾心理的進入債務獲得通過幾個或多或少不同的階段： （一）吸引大未來股息或收益在收入中的遙遠的未來; （ b ）在希望的銷售利潤，並實現1資本利得在不久的將來; （ c ）在流行的盲目促銷活動，利用習慣的市民極大的期望; （ d ）發展的徹頭徹尾的欺詐，強加給公眾的增長輕信和輕信。

Fisher then sums up his theory of debt, deflation and instability in one paragraph:費舍爾然後總結了他的理論的債務，通貨緊縮和不穩定的一個段落：

In summary, we find that: (1) economic changes include steady trends and unsteady occasional disturbances which act as starters for cyclical oscillations of innumerable kinds; (2) among the many occasional disturbances, are new opportunities to invest, especially because of new inventions; (3) these, with other causes, sometimes conspire to lead to a great volume of over-indebtedness; (4) this in turn, leads to attempts to liquidate; (5) these, in turn, lead (unless counteracted by reflation) to falling prices or a swelling dollar; (6) the dollar may swell faster than the number of dollars owed shrinks; (7) in that case, liquidation does not really liquidate but actually aggravates the debts, and the depression grows worse instead of better, as indicated by all nine factors; (8) the ways out are either laissez faire (bankruptcy) or scientific medication (reflation), and reflation might just as well have been applied in the first place.總之，我們認為： （ 1 ）經濟的變化包括穩定的和不穩定的趨勢偶爾騷亂作為首發的週期性振盪無數種; （ 2 ）之間的許多偶然的騷亂，是新的投資機會，尤其是因為新發明（ 3 ）這些，加上其他原因，有時合謀將導致大量的債務負擔過重; （ 4 ）這反過來又導致企圖清算; （ 5 ）這些反過來，鉛（除非所抵消通貨）價格下跌或腫脹美元; （ 6 ）美元可能膨脹速度超過了一些欠美元縮小; （ 7 ）在這種情況下，清算並不真正清算，但實際上加重了債務，而且越來越嚴重抑鬱症，而非更好的，如所有九個因素; （ 8 ）出路要么自由放任（破產）或科學用藥（通貨） ，以及通貨或許也同樣適用於已經擺在首位。

The lender of last resort function of central banks and government support of the financial system through GSEs and fiscal measures are the modern mechanisms of reflation.最後貸款人職能的中央銀行和政府支持的金融系統通過GSEs和財政措施是現代機制的通貨。 Like Keynes, I suspect that Fisher saw reflation as a limited and temporary intervention rather than a long term sustained policy of credit expansion a la Greenspan/Bernanke.凱恩斯一樣，我猜想，費希爾認為通貨作為一個有限的和暫時的干預，而不是一項長期持續的政策，信用擴張拉格林斯潘1 /伯南克。

I'm seriously worried that reflationary practice by Washington and the Fed in response to every market hiccup in recent decades was storing up a bigger debt deflation problem for the future.我很認真地擔心景氣的做法，美國和美聯儲針對每一個市場打嗝在近幾十年是儲存了一個更大的債務通貨緊縮問題的未來。 This very scary chart (click through to view) gives a measure of the threat in comparing Depression era total debt to GDP to today's much higher debt to GDP.這太可怕圖（點擊查看）提供了一定程度的威脅比較蕭條時代的債務總額佔國內生產總值到今天的高得多的債務與國內生產總值。

Certainly Washington and the Fed have been very enthusiastic and innovative in "reflating" the debt-sensitive financial, real estate, automotive and consumer sectors for the past many years.當然，華盛頓和美聯儲一直非常熱情和創新的“ reflating ”債務敏感的金融，房地產，汽車和消費部門在過去的許多年。 I'm tempted to coin a new noun for reflation enthusiasm: refllatio?我很想硬幣一個新的名詞的通貨再膨脹的熱情： refllatio ？

Had Fisher observed the Greenspan/Bernanke Fed in action, he might have updated his theory with a revision.費希爾指出了格林斯潘/伯南克在美聯儲的行動，他可能已經更新了他的理論與修訂。 At some point, capital betrayed into unproductive works has to either be repaid or written off.在某一點上，資本背叛到非生產性工程都必須償還或註銷。 If either is inhibited by reflation or regulatory forbearance, then a cost is imposed on productive works, whether through inflation, higher interest, diversion of consumption, or taxation to socialise losses.如果是抑制通貨或監管忍，那麼成本是對生產力的作品，無論是通過通貨膨脹，高利息，轉移消費，或稅收社交損失。 Over time that cost ultimately hollows out the real productive economy leaving only bubble assets standing.隨著時間的推移，成本最終這空洞的現實生產力的經濟只留下泡沫資產的地位。 Without a productive foundation, as reflation and forbearance reach their limits, those bubble assets must deflate.沒有生產力的基礎，通貨和忍耐達到了極限，這些泡沫資產的必須壓縮。

Fisher's debt deflation theory was little recognised in his lifetime, probably because he was right in drawing attention to the systemic failures that precipitated the crash.費舍爾的債務緊縮的理論是沒有認識到他的一生，可能是因為他是正確的，提請注意的系統性失敗，沉澱的崩潰。 Speaking truth to power isn't a ticket to popularity today either.談到真相的權力是不是一個受歡迎的入場券今天的。

Thank you, Professor Roubini, for being brave enough to challenge orthodoxy before the crash, and for being generous enough to share your forum so that we can collectively address the causes and consequences of financial excess today.謝謝你，教授魯比尼，成為敢於挑戰正統在飛機墜毀前成功，並正在慷慨地分享您的論壇，以便我們能夠共同處理的原因和後果的金融過剩的今天。

Hattip: Robert Dimand, Department of Economics Brock University St. Hattip ：羅伯特Dimand ，經濟學系布羅克大學街 Catharines Ontario Canada for all of his efforts to rehabilitate Fisher's debt deflation theory.凱瑟琳加拿大安大略省他的一切努力恢復費的債務緊縮理論。

Hattip: The Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis for making Fisher's entire 1933 paper from Econometrica available online in PDF. Hattip ：聯邦儲備銀行聖路易斯的決策Fisher的整個1933年的文件Econometrica在網上提供PDF格式。

Hattip: Guest on 2008-07-29 21:10:21 for the debt/GDP chart. Hattip ：客戶在08年七月29號21點10分21秒的債務/ GDP圖表。

Hattip: SWK/Kilgores for suggesting a post on Fisher. Hattip ： SWK / Kilgores的建議後對費希爾。